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Summary. Using a 2001 provincial survey, we find that disparities in land-rights distribution
have greatly increased in rural China, and the growth of land markets is directly responsible for
that. The land markets tend to concentrate land in those who can more efficiently use it. This
translates disparities in land-rights distribution to magnified inequality in farm income. However,
such widening disparities caused by land markets have compensatory effects on overall rural
inequality, as land markets tend to bring up families who would fall at the bottom of income
distribution in the absence of such markets. Expansion of markets, in this case, widens the access
to market opportunities and help to reduce inequality in an economy that is undergoing both fast
development and a transition to market.
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1. INTRODUCTION
When China’s Ministry of Agriculture first conducted a survey on the emerging land
rental markets in rural China in 1993, they found that 2.3 percent of surveyed rural households
had participated in such private exchanges of land-use rights and 2.9 percent of arable land had
changed hands (Chen & Han, 2002). Six years later, when a similar survey was conducted again,
not much change was detected. The proportion of arable land exchanged on the primitive land
rental markets remained at between 3 to 4 percent. Zhejiang Province, located on the eastern
coast, emerged as a leader then, with a 7 percent market participation (Kung, 2002; Zhang, 2002).
Since then, land rental markets in rural China experienced rapid growth. One survey of rural
Zhejiang in May 2001 finds the proportions of rural households and arable land involved in
market exchanges rising to 20.8 and 13.1 percents, respectively (CARD, 2001). Alerted to this
fast growth and to the fact that a regulative legal framework was absent, the central government
had to issue a guiding directive in November 2002, and then the national legislature passed the
new Rural Land Contract Law, taking effect in March 2003, to regulate this evolving field.
The emergence of market-mediated allocation of rural land rights is no small matter for a
country that has a large amount of surplus rural labor and faces severe land scarcity. It raises
many pressing questions. Do rental markets increase inequality in land-rights distribution? Does
inequality in income derived from agricultural production subsequently rise as well? Does the
market-mediated movement of land rights help to increase farm productivity? Furthermore, what
effects do land rental markets have on the overall income inequality in rural China?
The emerging land markets could usher in a decisive departure from the previous
egalitarian, administrative allocation of land rights in rural China. When decollectivization was
implemented in rural China at the outset of the Reform, use rights of collectively owned rural land
were individualized and allocated to rural households on the basis of egalitarian principles (Kung,
1995; Putterman, 1993). Studies later find that, in the course of the Reform, egalitarianism still
prevailed in land rights distribution within villages, as villages reshuffled land allocation to undo
the inequality created by demographic changes, often disregarding the central government’s call
for long-term tenure security (Kung, 2000; Liu, Carter, & Yao, 1998). But these egalitarian
2outcomes could soon be reversed when market exchanges of land rights replace administrative
allocation. Rental markets could hasten China’s “retreat from equality by allowing better
endowed families having expanded land holdings, while others being dispossessed.
When equality is given priority under this system of land-rights allocation, efficiency in
land utilization retreats to a second place.1 Reallocations of land are found to have attenuated
tenure security and reduced investment in land (Brandt et al., 2002). Allocation of land on the
basis of ascriptive membership and the difficulty for land rights to circulate among villagers also
resulted in the mismatching of land with other productive resources and loss in efficiency. 2
Studies also find the coexistence of severe land scarcity on the one hand and increasing idling and
under-utilization of land on the other (Wang, 2002). Market-mediated allocation of land rights
can, therefore, help to raise agricultural output and efficiency. Conceivably, rental markets could
also move land from land-rich families, who lack adequate labor to utilize it, to land-scarce ones,
who have surplus labor to spare, and therefore maintain equality as well as increase efficiency.
This research uses data from a unique farm survey to address the four questions raised
above. The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes a baseline of rural
inequality before land markets developed, providing a base for over time comparison. Against
that backdrop, Section 3 then presents evidence of increasing inequality in land rights distribution
and connects it to the growth of land rental markets. These changes in land distribution had
notable impacts on farm income and farm productivity, and evidence on that is presented in
Section 4. Following that, Section 5 then investigates whether these changes compensate or
further polarize overall rural income inequality. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. RURAL INEQUALITY BEFORE THE LAND MARKET
To assess the status of inequality in rural China before land rental markets developed, the
two large-scale surveys (the Chinese Household Income Projects, henceforth CHIP) jointly
conducted by a group of Chinese and American scholars in 1988 and 1995 and the publications
that ensued provide the best benchmarks (Griffin & Zhao, 1993; Khan & Riskin, 1998, 2001).
Four major findings concerning inequalities among rural households within a given region are
particularly noteworthy. First, compared to income distribution, wealth was more equally
distributed among rural households. Second, land dominated the many components of wealth and
was the most equally distributed asset. In 1988, the Gini index for land distribution is 0.54, when
land is measured in physical unit, and 0.31 when measured in output value (McKinley, 1993). In
1995, they change to 0.43 and 0.39, respectively (Brenner, 2001). This more equal distribution of
land means that incomes derived from land could offset inequalities generated from other sources
and have equalizing effects on rural income distribution. However, these studies also find that, in
terms of income determination, land only had a minimal effect on total household income, which
means that its more equal distribution largely failed to translate into more equal distribution of
household income. Last but not the least, the most important source of income inequality in rural
China was incomes from off-farm wages, which constituted 40 percent of overall inequality in
rural income distribution in 1995 (Khan & Riskin, 1998). The distribution of wages has also
become more unequal over the years. The Gini index for wages increased from 0.71 in 1988 to
0.74 in 1995, when the Gini index for total income was only 0.34 in 1988 and 0.42 in 1995.
Overall, it is fair to conclude from these findings that, if we bracket urban-rural, inter-
regional, and gender inequalities, then inequalities among rural households were mainly caused
by unequal access to off-farm wage employment, whereas both land holdings and incomes
generated from land in farming productions were highly equally distributed. The trend over time
3suggested increasing inequality. The contribution of wage employment to household income rose
from 8.7 percent in 1988 to 22.38 in 1995, at the same time, that from household production
dropped from 74.2 to 56.2 percent, meaning that an increasingly large proportion of rural
household income was becoming highly unequally distributed.
The 1988 and 1995 CHIP surveys covered the first two thirds of the post-reform era in
China with the best data available and offered accurate accounts of inequality in rural China
during those times. After another eight years have passed since the data were gathered, an update
is much needed, and the effect of new developments such as the land rental markets on the trends
picked up in these studies requires new analysis. In this study, I employ data generated from a
provincial survey toward this goal. The data were collected from a multi-stage stratified random
survey conducted in Zhejiang Province in Eastern China during the summer of 2001. The survey
covered 7 of the province’s 10 sub-regions in the mainland and have representative counties from
each of the three geographic regions in the province. Interviews were conducted both with
randomly selected rural households in a village and with the village head. Thus, data were
collected at both the household and village level. The final household sample contains 972 valid
cases and the village sample 58 villages.3
3. INEQUALITY IN LAND-RIGHTS DISTRIBUTION
Except for some state-owned forest and pasture, most rural land in China is collectively
owned. This is a direct legacy of the collectivization campaign in the late 1950s, which undid the
earlier Land Reform by eliminating private land ownership, forming productive cooperatives (and
eventually collective communes), and locating land ownership in such collective units. The
decollectivization reform in the early 1980s only individualized the use rights of rural land, but
left land ownership in the hands of rural collective organizations. Thus, land markets in rural
China are only rental markets, where the use rights of land, not ownership, are exchanged. In this
paper, land distribution and land exchange all refer to that of use rights, not ownership.
The collective land ownership determines that in distributing the individualized use rights
of collectively owned land, egalitarian principles should be followed and all members of
collective organizations were equally entitled to the access to this important means of production.
Empirical studies conducted in the 1980s and 1990s have consistently found that the egalitarian
distribution of land use rights was indeed the norm in real practices (Kung, 1995; Liu et al., 1998;
Ye, Prosterman, Schwarzwalder, & Kuang, 2000; Zhu, 1995).4 When land was distributed on the
basis of household demographic features, not surprisingly, demographic changes over time would
render previous distribution unequal and generate demands for reallocation. Most studies found
the frequency of village-wide reallocation during the 80s and 90s to be once in every eight to ten
years, supplemented by partial reallocations of smaller scales (Brandt et al., 2002; Li & Rozelle,
1998; Liu et al., 1998).
However, not all reallocations were caused by demographic changes or intended to
equalize land distribution. Several other forces have also been discussed as potential causes
(Kung, 2000; Li & Rozelle, 1998). So theoretically, reallocations could cut both ways with
respect to inequality in land distribution. So far, there has been no decisive evidence on the effect
of reallocation on the extent of inequality in land distribution. But the two CHIP surveys, 7 years
apart, do reveal some interesting patterns. Brenner (2001) finds that in physical terms, land
holdings became more equally distributed in 1995 than in 1988, as shown in the decline of the
Gini index from 0.54 to 0.43 in columns 3 and 4 in Table 1. He suspects that villages’ land
reallocations, “dominated by egalitarian considerations (p. 252),” are a major cause. But when
4measured in value terms of agricultural output, there was an increase in land inequality, shown in
the rise of the Gini index from 0.31 to 0.39 between 1988 and 1995.5
On the basis of the best evidence available, we could conclude that administrative land
reallocations alone would not lead to substantial increase in inequality in land distribution.
Against this backdrop, if we find dramatic changes in land distribution since the growth of land
rental markets have accelerated in the late 1990s, then such changes are primarily attributable to
the growth of land rental markets.
(a) Increasing inequality in land-rights distribution
Table 1 reports the distribution of arable land among rural households in the 2001
Zhejiang sample and compares it with findings from the two CHIP surveys. The most remarkable
finding is the highly unequal distribution of physical units of land. In the Zhejiang sample, 60
percent of all arable land concentrates in the top 10 percent of households, ranked by household
land holding. Half of the households (the top five deciles) have nearly 90 percent of all arable
land.6 Given the fact that half of all arable land in our sample is irrigated and the productivity
differential between irrigated and unirrigated land could be large, I also report distribution of
irrigated land in Table 1. The inequality in that distribution is only slightly less pronounced than
that in undifferentiated land. At the two extremes of the distribution, we find very different rural
households. There are 43 rural households that have rented out all their land and transferred all
their working members to off-farm jobs. On the other hand, while the average farm size is only
6.04 mu, there are 16 families have farms larger than 50 mu and seven of them over 100 mu,7 all
having acquired most of their land from rental markets.
[Table 1 about here.]
The contrasts with findings from the 1980s and 90s are striking. The Gini index for
distribution of land units in the 2001 sample is 0.67, significantly higher than the comparable
national figures of 0.54 in 1988 and 0.43 in 1995.8 A few caveats here. First, the two studies using
the CHIP data only reported the distribution of land value by decile, but not that of land in
physical units. Therefore, those figures are not exactly comparable to ours. However, they did
report inequality measures (both Gini index and coefficient of variation) for distribution of land in
physical units, allowing direct comparison. Second, figures from the CHIP data were national,
while our figures are provincial. But given the wide interregional disparities in China, the national
data in fact would only enlarge the extent of inequality. Consider the contrast between Zhejiang
and Jilin, two of the provinces covered in the CHIP surveys. In 1995, the per capita cultivated
land in Zhejiang is only 0.91 mu, less than one sixth of that in Jilin (5.58 mu) (State Statistical
Bureau, 1996). The Gini index for Zhejiang in those years would only be smaller and thus, the
distribution more equal. Third, the Zhejiang survey measures land in its physical unit. Obviously,
land quality varies a lot and, in an ideal situation, should be factored in as well. However, my data
do not have that information. 9 Therefore, the distribution reported in Table 1 only applies to the
absolute volume of physical land. The distribution of productivity-adjusted land could be less
unequal, but could also be more. McKinley (1993) and Brenner (2001) adjusted productivity
differential by imputing a value of land from the agricultural income it produces.10 For the 1988
data, the Gini index dropped from 0.54 for distribution of physical land units to 0.31 for that of
land value and the coefficient of variation dropped from 3.51 to 0.76. But in the 1995 data, the
difference between these two measures is much smaller. To draw a closer comparison, I did the
same exercise (imputing a value of land from the agricultural income it produces), but the results
still show significant increase in inequality: Gini index remains at a high level of 0.57 (compared
5to 0.39 in the 1995 CHIP data) and the coefficient of variation is 1.85 (compared to 1.17 in 1995).
So I am confident that the finding of increased inequality in land-rights distribution would stand
even if land quality could be fully factored in.
(b) Land rental markets as a cause of increasing inequality
Earlier I hypothesized that the increase in land distribution inequality, if any, is most
likely caused by the growth of land rental markets. Now that we have found evidence of
increasing inequality, the question becomes: Can we ascertain that the growth of rental markets
contributes to such increasing inequality? To address this question, I apply the village-level data
in the Zhejiang survey and try to find out whether land distribution inequality is greater in villages
where the land rental market is more active.
I use the Gini coefficient of households’ land holdings in a village as the dependent
variable, measuring the extent of inequality in land distribution. Among the independent
variables, the level of off-farm development is measured by the percentage of village labor force
employed in off-farm jobs. The level of rental-market development is measured by the percentage
of total village land exchanged on rental markets. I also include measures of two alternative
modes of land rights movement: administrative land reallocation (measured in number of
reallocations) and expropriation of collective land by state agencies (measured in the percentage
of a village’s arable land being expropriated).
A brief explanation about land expropriation is in order. Rural land in China is collectively
owned, but Chinese laws give the state the power to expropriate rural land from its collective
owners and divert it to non-agricultural uses. In a village where land is expropriated, affected
villagers may lose some or even all of their land holdings. Sometimes they are compensated in
money, sometimes offered off-farm jobs and resettled. The village may also reallocate its land to
accommodate these dispossessed villagers, but practices varied. In our sample, 47.5 percent of
villages have had land expropriated. Since a great majority (68.8 percent) of these expropriations
took place after 1998, their effects on village land distribution may still be observable.
[Table 2 about here.]
Results from the regression analysis are reported in Table 2, lending support to my
hypothesis. In villages where more arable land is exchanged on rental markets, land rights are
significantly more unequally distributed, resulting in greater Gini coefficients. Higher level of per
capita income and less arable land in a villager are also found to be associated with more unequal
land distribution. Higher levels of income allow greater investment in land acquisition and larger
sizes of transaction by each household. Thus, even though the same amount (or proportion) of
village land is exchanged, the land can be concentrated in a smaller number of households in
villages with greater capital endowments, accentuating land inequality.11
The two alternative modes of land rights movement do not have significant effects.
Because most of the reallocations (averaging 3.8 times for villages in the sample) happened
before land markets developed, I suspect that their equalizing effects on land distribution have
been netted out by the disequalizing effects of later market transactions. When land-market
development is controlled, growth in off-farm employment is not significant either. This suggests
that without the venue supplied by the land rental markets, growth of off-farm employment and
transfer of agricultural labor to industries alone do not necessarily lead to movement of land rights
from households with off-farm jobs to those without. In the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the evidence above confirms that the development of land rental markets indeed contributed to the
widening disparities in land-rights distribution.
64. EFFECTS OF LAND MARKETS ON FARM INCOME
Using the CHIP data, Khan (pp. 98-100, 1993) finds that in 1988 each additional mu of
land only contributes 1.18 yuan to the annual household income from farm production. The trend
is similar in 1995: one percent change in land holding gives rise to only 0.16 percent change in
household farm income (p. 218, Zhang, 2001). Although these figures should not be taken
literally as a measure of land productivity in rural China, they do indicate that land is not a major
contributor to differences in income rising from farm production. Substantively, it means that by
having more land alone, a household will only be marginally better off financially, because for
some reason, they do not seem to be able to generate much value from those additional land. The
analysis above shows that land has now become more unequally distributed in rural Zhejiang. But
if the financial pay-off from land is still minimal, as it was in the past, then such unequal
distribution of this productive asset will be inconsequential, as far as income inequality is
concerned. Does the more unequal distribution of land rights now translate to more unequal
distribution of incomes generated from the land? Can rural households get more out of their land
through farming production? Is land becoming more significant in determining farm incomes?
Behind these empirical questions, there is a more theoretical one: Are land markets
allowing land to be more efficiently used, so that land becomes more valuable and tilling the land
now generates greater value than before? The emerging land market could differ from the
traditional method of land allocation in rural China in one important aspect: it allocates land to
families that can make better use of it. The traditional method allocates land to families primarily
on the basis of their ascriptive membership in the collective organization, sometimes taking into
consideration their labor endowment, but often disregarding their command over other
complementary resources. This traditional method could, as Brandt et al. (2002) argue, increase
allocative efficiency with regard to labor, because it tends to equalize the land-to-labor ratio
across households. But this could in fact be a very inefficient allocation, if we take into
consideration of variations among households in their command over other productive resources,
such as farm machines, draft animals, financial capital, and human skills. This could be the reason
behind the extremely low impact that land has on farm income in China during the 80s – land is
not matched with other productive resources, resulting in its under-utilization (Khan 1993).
The rental markets, however, operate differently. Villagers increase or reduce their farm
size voluntarily. It would not be far-fetched to assume in this situation that villagers are
strategically allocating their resource endowment to seek greater financial returns. Those who
think additional land can help them make better use of their resource and skill endowments seek
to increase their land holdings, creating a movement of land from less efficient users to more
efficient ones and, in turn, resulting in greater financial returns to land-based productive activities.
This section therefore focuses on these two issues: first, whether land now has greater
effects on farm income, and second, whether land markets help to create more efficient use of
land, contributing to the rising returns to land. Table 3 reports results from two nested regression
models.12 (For variable definitions and descriptive statistics, see Appendicx A.)
[Table 3 about here.]
Model 2 contains household characteristics and six regional dummies to control inter-
regional variation. 13 This model differs from conventional models of income-determination
analysis in that it does not include any human capital variables, such as age and education. A rural
household’s human capital endowments largely determine its income strategy (de Brauw, Huang,
Rozelle, Zhang, & Zhang, 2002; Zhang, Ma, & Xu, forthcoming), as younger and better educated
7households favor off-farm employment, whereas older and more experienced farmers rely more
on farm income. These income strategies then affect household income through the mediation of
labor force allocation and capital investment. Thus, fitting human capital variables and farm size
and farm labor into the same model causes multicollinearity. Because our main interest here is in
the effect of farm size on farm income, not on the rewards to human capital, I decide to exclude
the human capital variables. I also include two variables (use of farm machines and cash
cropping) to control the heterogeneity of conditions under which land is used in different
households. Appendix D summarizes steps taken in selecting the final model.
When holding all other things equal, one percent change in farm size leads to nearly one
percent (0.95) change in household farm income, a much stronger effect than the 0.16 percent
change found in the 1995 CHIP data (p. 218, Zhang, 2001).14 The trend seems to be clear: rural
households in Zhejiang can now generate much more output and income from the land.
The question then becomes: What have contributed to this rise in farm productivity? Many
causes are relevant, for instance, greater investment in infrastructure, more use of technology,
improved seeds and fertilizers and so on. But I suspect that the land rental market also made a
difference through more efficiently allocating the land. To test this, in Model 3, I add in two
variables measuring a household’s land-market participation. 15 What I want to know here is
whether market participation affects farm output and income, when farm size is controlled. If
exchanges on rental markets only affect the size of one’s land holding, then when the size is
controlled, market participation would make no difference on output, measured as farm income.
Otherwise, market participation then affects not just farm size, i.e., the scale of production, but is
correlated with a household’s productive efficiency as well.
The models show strong and highly significant effects of both types of market exchanges
on farm income, when farm size is controlled. The coefficient of having inflow transactions is
0.55, meaning that if two households have the same farm size, other variables controlled, the one
household that have chosen to rent more land from the market (a lessee) is able to get 73 percent
more farm income than the one whose land is not market allocated.16 Similarly, a family that
chose to rent out land on markets (a lessor) were only able to get 29 percent as much income from
the same scale of farm production as those who did not choose to do so. Clearly, lessee and lessor
families have very different efficiencies in utilizing the land. The evidence suggests that rental
markets indeed have created the type of land movement I hypothesized – away from less efficient
users, and toward more efficient ones.17 At the aggregate level, this leads to the observed greater
returns to land.
These findings suggest that different types of market participation (could also be thought
as different investment strategies) are associated with different levels of farm productivity. Two
mechanisms could produce such an outcome. First, there can be a sorting mechanism that select
differentially endowed rural residents into different sectors.18 It is widely accepted that the
younger and the better educated have comparative advantages in off-farm works and many in fact
left villages (and rent out land) without having any full-time farming experiences (de Brauw et al.,
2002). On the other hand, facing participation constraints in the off-farm sector, the older and the
more experienced farmers find expanding farm production a better alternative (Zhang et al.,
forthcoming). Second, besides this sorting mechanism that selects more productive farmers into
expanding farm production, the market-mediated change in the scale of production itself can also
affect farm productivity, as increased farm production benefits from the economy of scale. To
find out whether lessee families are more productive in using the land, I run two regression
models to further assess the effect of market transaction on farm productivity.19
8[Table 4 about here.]
In Table 4, when farm size is controlled, we find that the lessee households (i.e., the
“inflow” variable) have 72 percent higher land productivity (Model 4) and 75 percent higher labor
productivity (Model 5) than the rest. In these households, each unit of land can generate 72
percent more agricultural output, and each farm laborer can get 75 percent more income, than
counterparts in other households with the same farm size.20 In contrast, the lessor families (the
“outflow” variable) have significantly lower land productivity (71 percent less) and labor
productivity (70 percent less) than ordinary families. The more able-bodied members in these
households probably have moved to better-paying off-farm jobs, resulting in decline of land
utilization and thus land and labor productivity.21 This further demonstrates that the movement of
land rights regulated by the rental market is concentrating land in households that can better use
it, and as a result, raising overall efficiency in land use and financial returns to land. This marks a
clear departure from the administrative allocation of land, which, based primarily on families’
labor endowment, tends to equalize land-to-labor ratio across families and maintain allocative
(static) efficiency at the expense of productive efficiency.
Farm size also significantly affects productivity. In the context of severe land scarcity and
labor surplus in rural China, increased farm size allows underutilized surplus labor to be better
used, resulting in improved labor productivity (Model 5). However, this also causes reduction in
the intensification of land use, as labor-to-land ratio declines. Thus, we find larger farm size
associated with reduced land productivity (Model 4). Farm labor also shows expected effects on
productivity. When more labor is employed, it intensifies land use and increases land productivity
(Model 4, each additional labor increases land productivity by 38 percent); but as land-to-labor
ratio declines, it also causes labor productivity to decline (Model 5, each additional labor
decreases labor productivity by 16 percent). There are also pronounced regional variations. The
four counties located in the Yangzi Delta area, which traditionally has been one of China’s most
fertile regions, have significantly higher land productivity.
Overall, two important findings have transpired. First, land has become a stronger factor
in determining farm income, and consequently, a more valuable asset than before. If Zhang
(2001) is correct, in 1995, having one percent less land only cost a family 0.16 percent in
production income. No big deal. But in 2001, one percent less land may cost a family in rural
Zhejiang 0.94 percent of their farm income. The stake on farm land has risen considerably.
Second, the rental market not only created disparities in land rights across rural households, it did
so in a way that magnifies income disparities generated from the land. Not only more productive
farmers are expanding their farm production through renting more land, the larger scale of
production also raises their labor productivity, increasing their returns from working on the land
and thus translating disparities in land rights to magnified inequalities in farm income.
5. EFFECTS OF LAND MARKETS ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME
Discussions above seem to portray the land rental markets emerging in rural China as a
polarizing force, increasing disparities in land-rights distribution and farm income. However, it is
premature to reach a verdict on the effect of land markets on overall rural inequality, as the
discussion so far has been limited to incomes from farm productions. Income from off-farm
sources has not been considered yet, which virtually all studies of income determination in rural
China during the post-reform era find to be the most significant source of income inequality.22 As
far as rural land is restricted to agricultural uses only, which is still mostly true in China,
inequality in land-rights and farm income and that in off-farm income are two distinctive
9dimensions, which could either reinforce each other or cancel out each other. We already know
that land markets help a fraction of the rural population to get better off, but do land markets bring
up families at the bottom of the scale of off-farm income (i.e., being compensatory to off-farm
inequality), or those already better off (i.e., being reinforcing)?
Findings in the above already offer some clues. For instance, in Model 3 we find that
cadre and entrepreneurial households, which have been consistently found to have better access to
off-farm wage incomes (Walder, 2002), had either disadvantages or no advantage in farm income.
Furthermore, education has not been found to have positive effects on farm income and farming
productivity (results not shown here), in contrast to the finding that participation in off-farm jobs
rewards education (Nee, 1996; Parish et al., 1995). This would encourage families with greater
educational capital to enter off-farm jobs, while encourage a very different group – those with low
educational attainment – to choose to improve their lot through expanding farming. Both these
findings suggest that land markets are more likely to be compensatory.
[Table 5 about here.]
To confirm this, I look at profiles of households with different types of participation in the
land markets. In Table 5, we can observe almost a linear pattern on all the variables in the three
types of households. The lessor families have the smallest family size and largest number of
family members working in off-farm jobs, indicating that these families probably parted with
their land because they had better-paying off-farm jobs to guarantee subsistence. These families
also have greater human capital in terms of higher educational attainment and younger labor
forces. As a proxy for experience, age, in rural China’s context, is correlated with experience in
farming, a type of human capital not transferable to off-farm works. Moreover, it in fact is a
liability in off-farm jobs, as farmers-turned-workers are wanted mostly for their physical labor
power (de Brauw et al., 2002). Furthermore, both cadre and entrepreneur households have the
strongest presence in this group of households, both 40 percent higher than in the overall sample.
In direct contrast, lessee families have the largest family size and the smallest number of off-farm
jobs. These families also have the lowest educational attainment. But they have older labor forces,
indicating more age-based human capital in farming. The presence of cadre and entrepreneurs in
this group is also the lowest. Households that did not participate in land markets are sandwiched
between these two types.
The next four columns in Table 5 show the results of households’ participation in both
land and labor markets. The difference in farm size is striking. It clearly shows that the land
market, unlike administrative reallocations, did not move land from land-rich families to land-
poor ones and equalize land holdings. Instead, it dramatically increased disparities in land
holdings. The 138 lessee families have more land (3,109 mu) than families in the other two
categories combined (2,674 mu), which are six times as large in number.
To return to our question about whether land markets are compensatory or reinforcing to
inequality from off-farm sources, the results suggest that land markets are indeed compensatory.
Families that have the least amount of land, became so not because they were forced out of their
land. Instead, they were more successful in obtaining better-paying off-farm jobs and thus leaving
agriculture, thanks to their higher education, younger labor forces, and special status (as cadres or
entrepreneurs). As studies have long found, this is the group that has got ahead in rural China. But
the more interesting comparison is between the lessee households and those who did not
participate in land markets. If we have learned anything from two decades’ studies of inequality
in post-1978 rural China, we would conclude that the former group, with the least number of
cadres and entrepreneurs, the lowest level of education, and the least number of off-farm jobs,
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would be at the very bottom of the scale of income distribution, were there not land rental
markets. But land markets have brought up this group from the bottom by offering an alternative
venue for increasing income – through expanding farming production, which caters to their
specific resource endowment. Now, as a group, these families are better off (17 percent higher per
capita income) than the latter group, which constitutes the majority of the population.
To measure the magnitude of this observed welfare effect of rental markets on overall
income distribution, I decompose total household income into two income sources – farm and off-
farm incomes – and compare their Gini coefficients.23 When households are ranked by the annual
income from each specific source, the Gini coefficient for farm and off-farm incomes is 0.67 and
0.46, respectively; whereas the Gini coefficient for total household income is only 0.37. The fact
that both components of total income are more unequally distributed than total income already
indicates that unequal distributions of the two do not overlap, but instead partly cancel out each
other. This is better shown when we calculate the aggregate-ranked Gini coefficient for each
component, in which we rank households by their total income. This enables us to determine
whether the distribution of a particular type of income accentuates or diminishes inequality in
total income. The aggregate-ranked Gini coefficient for farm and off-farm incomes is,
respectively, 0.22 and 0.41. Compared to the Gini coefficient for total income (0.37), it shows that
farm income has an equalizing effect, whereas off-farm income has a disequalizing effect.
Furthermore, when we calculate the Gini coefficient for land using the aggregate ranking by total
income, it becomes only 0.16, showing a strong equalizing effect of land distribution on total
income inequality. Elsewhere, through regressing participation in rental markets on household
characteristics, I also found that more off-farm jobs significantly increase a household’s
likelihood of renting out land, but decrease that of renting in land (Zhang et al., forthcoming). In
sum, by moving land to rural families with fewer off-farm income sources, the rental markets
allowed these families to have larger shares of arable land and farm income, offsetting their
disadvantages in off-farm sources and equalizing overall income distribution.
6. DISCUSSION
In rural Zhejiang, where land rental markets have experienced fast growth in recent years,
we find that disparities in land-rights distribution increased greatly and the growth of land
markets is directly responsible for that. The rental markets allocate land very differently from the
more egalitarian administrative allocation, and tend to concentrate land in those who can more
efficiently use it. This, on the one hand, increases productivity in farming production; and on the
other hand, translates disparities in land-rights distribution to magnified inequality in farm
income. However, we find that such increasing inequality caused by the emerging land markets is
in fact compensatory to overall rural inequality, as land markets tend to bring up families who
would fall at the bottom of rural income distribution in the absence of such markets. Land
markets, therefore, offer an alternative venue to off-farm employment, which previously has been
the primary source of the inequitable growth of rural incomes, and help to offset the inequality
thus created.
Although the findings in Zhejiang could be a harbinger of what is to come in other parts of
the country, it should not be hastily generalized. The encouraging developments in Zhejiang’s
rural land markets cannot overshadow the increasing stress rural residents are experiencing in
many parts of China (Bernstein & Lu, 2003; Khan & Riskin, 2001). Furthermore, this study has
not been able to measure the effect of rural households’ capital endowment on participation in
rental markets. It is possible that a threshold in capital endowment excluded families at the very
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bottom from taking advantages of rental markets.24 Thus, the rental market does not extend its
equalizing effect to the entire rural population, nor is it sufficient in protecting the very poor. We
should be cautious in drawing optimistic conclusions from this account.
The findings here, however, do speak to two strands of theories, one economic, one
sociological. On the relationship between economic transition and inequality, we find two
opposing predictions from economic and sociological theories. In economics, Kuznets (1955)
offers his famous inverted U-shaped curve, depicting the worsening of income inequality at the
early phases of economic growth, followed by a leveling off in later stages. In sociological studies
of transition from socialist redistributive to market economies, scholars instead theorize a U-
shaped trajectory (Szelenyi & Kostello, 1996). When market mechanism first emerged in the form
of restricted “local markets”, it acted as a compensatory one to the dominant redistributive
mechanism and helped to bring up peoples at the bottom and reduce inequality. However, as
market penetration deepens, the elite started to capture the market and were able to reproduce and
reinforce their privileges through markets. As a result, inequality grows as the transition moves
into the stage of “mixed economies.”
Today’s China is undergoing both fast economic growth and a transition to a market
economy. But does it follow a U-shaped or inverted U-shaped trajectory in terms of changes in
inequality? To address this debate is beyond the competence of this paper. Furthermore, with the
short distance we have from the still fast-evolving reality, it probably is impossible to pin down
which phase China’s growth and transition are at now, let alone to draw a trajectory. But since
both theories predict a seemingly inevitable widening of inequality at some stages of the process,
we therefore want to look at whether the inequality-reducing effects of land markets in rural
Zhejiang could shed some light on how to containing such widening of inequality.
One of the reasons that Kuznets thought cause widening of income inequality in early
phases of economic growth is the “dislocating effects of agricultural and industrial revolutions (p.
18, 1955),” which bear upon the lower-income groups particularly hard. In China’s case, I
believe, the two-tiered land tenure system has acted as an important check on such dislocating
effects of industrialization. The collective ownership of rural land guarantees farmers the access
to land on the basis of their ascriptive membership in the collective communities and makes this
access largely economically inalienable. It therefore prevents urban and industrial capital from
dispossessing farmers of their land. The coupling of this collective ownership and the rising land
markets, which nevertheless enables land rights to circulate, manages to allow family-based
subsistence farming to continue on the one hand, while on the other hand, give the more
adventurous, who want to either move to off-farm jobs or enter larger-scale commercial farming,
the opportunity to exchange and specialize. Of course, this kind of institutions that safeguard the
disadvantaged from the dislocating effects of transition are not a new invention (Polanyi, 1944).
China’s East Asian neighbors also put restrictions on private land ownership during their take-off
phases. Taiwan, for instance, restricted the private transfer of both land ownership and use rights
(Zhu, 1995). South Korea enforced a three-hectare ceiling on land ownership and largely
eliminated free markets in land transactions (Lee, 1979). Zhejiang’s case once again demonstrates
the utility of such safeguarding institutions.
As China’s transition moves the country into a “socialist mixed economy”, there is little
doubt that in rural China market has become one of the dominant mechanisms in the “dual system
of inequality”, and is a major source of inequality. As market penetration deepens and market
increasingly becomes the dominant mechanism, Szelenyi & Kostello (1996) predict that the
former nomenklatura will become the biggest winners, and the earlier gains made by direct
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producers and petty bourgeoisie will be squeezed out, resulting in increasing inequality. The only
relief will come from the redistributive intervention of the state, which then serves as the
compensatory mechanism. However, findings here suggest that Nee’s (1996) prediction that
further expansion of markets leads to gains for direct producers could stand scrutiny, at least in
this limited study. If market expansion widens access to market opportunities and make markets
less restricted, or even monopolized by the elite, it could deliver the expected equalizing effects,
even as it is becoming the dominant mechanism in allocating resources. In other words, market
expansion does not have generic effects on inequality. It can both widen and reduce inequalities,
depending the specific institutional constitution of the markets.
In rural China’s experience, when the labor market that allocates better-paying off-farm
jobs becomes the dominant source of income inequality, and cadres enjoy privileges in that
market (Parish et al., 1995; Walder, 2002), it is the opening of the land market, where the
playground is still even, that helps to bring relief to families that are disadvantaged in the off-farm
sector, so that they can now also benefit from market opportunities. In other words, when access
to the dominant mechanism (labor market, in this case) is restricted, the disadvantaged do try to
find a compensatory mechanism. But such mechanism does not have to be a redistributive one. In
this case, it is the expansion of markets into a new field that comes to their rescue. This suggests
that further opening of rural markets (including land, grain and credit markets) could be the
remedy to the widening inequality in rural China, as others have argued (Khan & Riskin, 2001).
For instance, giving poor households access to credit markets can help them overcome the capital
endowment threshold and thus reap the benefit from participating in rental markets.
But how long can this new field remain leveled? Will Szelenyi’s prediction about elite’s
capturing of markets eventually prove to be right even for the land markets? The jury is still out.
It is certainly possible that the elite will be able to reap more benefit from this market by
transforming market institutions in their favor. In fact, some of this is already occurring. There are
already reports of coercive dispossessing of farmers of their land – in the name of promoting
market development – by cadres, who then sell the land rights to higher outside bidders and
pocket the profit (Song & Chen, 2001). On these questions, we wait for further studies.
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NOTES
                                                
1 The egalitarian nature of such allocations should not be taken too far. Village authorities often do have other goals
to meet in such allocations, one of them being raising agricultural output so that village grain quota is fulfilled. On
the diverse forces driving land reallocation, see (Brandt, Huang, Li, & Rozelle, 2002; Kung, 2000; Li & Rozelle,
1998; Liu et al., 1998). However, it is safe to say that egalitarian concerns often take priority over productivity.
2 One estimate (Brandt et al., 2002) puts the loss caused by misallocation of land across households at eight percent
of median household income for medium-sized farms and nearly 10 percent for small farms.
3 All households in the sample have rural registration and are members of rural collectives. They are entitled to, and
did, receive allocation of collective land, although some of them chose to relinquish their land rights on markets.
4 The exact principle of land distribution varied across localities. Some villages distributed land equally by household
population, others by household labor force, still others by some combination of household population and labor
force. Liu et al (1998), for instance, find the percentage of villages using these three principles to be 16.7, 26.7 and
53.3, respectively, with only 3.3 percent using some unidentified other methods.
5 Brenner (2001) finds no conclusive explanations for the rising disparities in agricultural output, his  proxy for land
value. But differential access to markets for farm products and differential labor inputs across regions are likely to be
the most important causes.
6 I also tried ranking cases not by household land holding, but by land per capita. The distribution is in fact slightly
more unequal in that case.
7 One mu equals 0.067 hectare.
8 The Gini index is scaled to vary from a minimum of zero to a maximum of one, zero representing no inequality and
one representing a maximum possible degree of inequality. The convention wisdom is that any change in the Gini
index of 10 percent or greater is considered significant, although it is not possible to statistically establish that a 10
percent or larger difference is significant. See Khan & Riskin (1998) for a discussion.
9 In fact, neither do the CHIP data, or any other large-scale surveys, for that matter, have that type of detailed
information on land quality. McKinley (1993) and Brenner (2001) both tried to compensate this by assigning
different weights to various types of land, treating one unit of irrigated land as equivalent of two units of unirrigated
land, a rather arbitrary practice.
10 This method, however, is far from satisfactory, as it conflates productivity differential caused by other factors of
production (labor, capital, and access to product markets, for instance) into that caused by land.
11 The direction of causality between income and land rights distribution can be ambiguous. My interpretation is only
speculative, and readers are free to draw their own conclusions.
12 These two models are run on a sub-sample, containing only those households that have land under cultivation and
have any income from agricultural sources. This is because our interest here is not in the distribution of farm income
per se, but rather the effect of land rights on the generation of farm income.
13 The omitted category is Dongyang County, an interior sub-region, the least developed in the sample.
14 The right skewed distribution of farm size requires that we transform the variable by taking the natural log. Since
the dependent variable has also been log-transformed, the coefficient for the log-transformed farm size variable can
be interpreted as the percent change in household farm income resulting from one percent change in this variable.
15 Because farm size is at least partly an outcome of land-market transactions, not surprisingly, adding in the two
land-transaction variables causes multicollinearity to rise in the model. The Pearson’s r correlation between farm size
and inflow transaction is 0.51, significant at 0.01 level. However, because all three variables are highly significant
and the theory requires an investigation of their independent effects, they are kept in the model.
16 The coefficient b here can be transformed through 100 x [ e b –1 ] to give us the percent change in the dependent
variable (farm income) caused by one unit change in the market-transaction variable.
17 Theoretically, the difference in land quality could be another explanation. If land transacted on the rental markets
are consistently of higher quality than the rest, then those who rent such higher-quality land would have better
farming productivity, while those who parted with such higher-quality land and left for themselves worse land would
have lower productivity. However, substantively there is no reason to see why households choose to consistently rent
out higher-quality land. Neither was this found to be the case in the interviews. In fact, even if that indeed were the
case, it would still need the market to work it out. In other words, it is still the rental markets that made the difference
by allowing this to happen.
18 I am indebted to a reviewer for clarifying this causal relationship.
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19 I also tried fitting Model 3 with an interaction term between farm size and inflow transaction. However, due to
collinearity caused by the high correlation between the two (r = 0.51), the interaction term is not significant.
20 As I noted before, farm size and land inflow have a significant correlation of 0.51. This cautions us in interpreting
the independent effects of land inflow in Model 4, when holding farm size constant, because land inflow often results
in increasing farm size. The standardized coefficients (beta) for these two variables in Model 4 are, respectively, -
0.21 for farm size and 0.12 for land inflow, meaning that the loss in land productivity caused by increased farm size
is greater than the gain resulting from the land inflow transaction.
21 It is also possible that their low-quality land makes farm production less profitable and thus leads them to move to
off-farm jobs and lease out their land. But this is less plausible.
22 The literature on this topic is vast. For some representative examples, see Parish, Zhe, & Li (1995), Kung & Lee
(2001), and Walder (2002).
23 I am indebeted to a reviewer for suggesting this exercise.
24 I thank a reviewer for bringing up this point.
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Table 1. The Distribution of Arable and Irrigated Land, and Inequality Measures.
2001 Zhejiang data 1988 & 1995 CHIP data
Total arable land Irrigated land 1988 1995
Distribution by decile
Lowest 0.4% 0.0% 3% 2.3%
Second 1.8% 1.0% 5% 4.7%
Third 2.3% 3.2% 7% 5.9%
Fourth 2.6% 4.9% 8% 7.1%
Fifth 3.7% 5.1% 8% 8.2%
Sixth 5.0% 6.2% 10% 9.3%
Seventh 6.7% 7.5% 12% 10.6%
Eighth 7.2% 8.2% 12% 12.5%
Ninth 10.9% 12.4% 15% 15.0%
Highest 59.3% 51.4% 20% 24.2%
Inequality measures
Coefficient of variation 3.14 4.52 3.51 (.76 ) .92 (1.17)
Gini coefficient .67 .61 .54 (.31 ) .43 (.39)
Source: First two columns are based on the author’s survey in Zhejiang, China (2001). There are
968 valid cases. The last two columns are adopted from McKinley (1993) and Brenner (2001).
Note: The distribution by decile in the last two columns differ from figures in the first two in two
respects: a) the deciles are ranked in terms of per capita total wealth, instead of per household
land holding; b) the percentages reported are those of land value, not of land in physical units.
Numbers in parentheses in columns 3 and 4 are inequality measures for distribution of land
measured in land value (agricultural output).







Total village land (mu, x 100) -.005‡ -.247 .003
Number of reallocations -.014 -.092 .019
Expropriated land .001 .057 .002
Level of land-market development .002* .286 .001
Level of off-farm development -.001 -.076 .001
Per capita income (yuan, x 100) .003** .350 .001
R-square .35
Number of valid cases 53
Source: Zhejiang Survey, 2001.
Statistical significance: ‡ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed test).
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Table 3. Model Coefficients From Regressions of Household Farm Income.
Model 2 Model 3
Independent Variables B S. E. B S. E.
Intercept 4.58*** .21 4.97*** .20
Farm operation
Farm size (ln) .95*** .07 .77*** .08
Farm labor .33*** .06 .33*** .06
Mechanized production .07 .11 .04 .10
Cash cropping .94*** .13 .74*** .12
Household characteristics
Cadre household -.62** .21 -.50* .20
Entrepreneur household -.04 .13 .02 .13
Regional location
Deqing County .59** .20 .87*** .19
Tongxiang County .85*** .19 .93*** .18
Xiaoshan County 1.53*** .20 1.47*** .19
Shaoxing County .57** .19 .69*** .18
Taizhou County .65‡ .38 .50 .36
Rui'an County -.16 .23 -.14 .22
Land-market activities
Land outflow (Lessor) -1.24*** .14
Land inflow (Lessee) .55*** .16
R square .44 .50
Degree of freedom 12 2
F-change 52.65*** 51.52***
N 823 823
Source: Same as Table 2.
Statistical significance: ‡ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***  p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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Independent Variables B S. E. B S. E.
Intercept 5.77*** .20 5.44*** .20
Farm operation
Farm size (ln) -.45*** .08 .75*** .08
Farm labor .32*** .06 -.18** .06
Mechanized production .01 .10 .03 .10
Cash cropping .72*** .12 .72*** .12
Household characteristics
Cadre household -.47* .20 -.49* .20
Entrepreneur household .01 .13 .04 .13
Regional location
Deqing County .76*** .19 .90*** .19
Tongxiang County .79*** .18 .98*** .18
Xiaoshan County 1.38*** .19 1.52*** .19
Shaoxing County .67*** .18 .72*** .18
Taizhou County .43 .36 .52 .36
Rui'an County -.13 .22 -.09 .21
Land-market activities
Land outflow (Lessor) -1.25*** .14 -1.21*** .14
Land inflow (Lessee) .54*** .16 .56*** .16
R square .32 .46
N 823 823
Source: Same as Table 2.
Statistical significance: ‡ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***  p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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Total 3.8 1.4 8.2 42.8 6.8 24.5 5.95 26551 77.20 7131 972
Lessor 3.7 1.7 8.5 40.9 9.4 34.2 2.31 32523 94.09 8942 266
Ordinary 3.9 1.3 8.1 43.5 6.3 21.1 3.61 23219 75.65 6240 568
Lessee 4.0 1.3 7.9 43.4 3.6 19.6 22.53 28753 51.14 7315 138
ANOVA b 3.30* 14.87*** 7.22*** 10.49*** 2.62‡ 9.60*** 73.37*** 16.11*** 127.30*** 19.74***
Source: Same as Table 2.
Notes: a Average age and education measure the average attributes of household members who are in the labor force. b Figures reported
are F statistics. I conducted Games-Howell post hoc tests (the Games-Howell test can adjust for unequal variances and sample sizes in
the groups). On all measures, means of the lessor group significantly differ from that of at least one of the other two groups.
Statistical significance: ‡ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***  p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
